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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the decision made by the Hawke government 
in March 1989 to build a third runway at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) 
Airport (KSA), subject to normal environmental impact procedures. 
It notes that this decision was commonly hailed as a policy-making 
success and that past government procrastination over the 
construction of a third runway has been conversely seen as policy-
making failure. The paper questions these perceptions of failure 
and success both by recounting the history of policy-making for 
Sydney's airport needs and by setting the Sydney experience in 
comparative international perspective . It argues that current 
congestion at KSA is only in small part a consequence of past 
government procrastination over runway development and that it is 
in much larger part a consequence of both unpredicted changes in 
the various sectors of the aviation industry and a rather passive 
traffic management and pricing approach adopted by the federal 
government's aviation authorities. It further argues that in the 
light of international experience, procrastination over runway 
development at KSA can be seen for many years to have been a 
significant policy-making success, and indeed can still be so seen 
today . One of the current benefits of not having runway 
construction at KSA nearing completion is that the aviation 
authorities and aviation industry users in Sydney may be induced 
to make both more efficient and equitable use of the existing 
runway facilities at KSA than they have done in the past, 
particularly during peak hours. 
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POLICY-MAKING FOR SYDNEY'S AIRPORT NEEDS: 
A Comparative and Historical Perspectivel 
INTRODUCTION 
Will Sanders 
National Research Fellow 
Urban Research Unit 
On 22 March 1989, the Prime Minister Bob Hawke and the Minister 
for Transport and Communications Ralph Willis announced that the federal 
Labor government had decided to develop a third runway at Sydney 
(Kingsford Smith) Airport (KSA), subject to the satisfactory completion of 
normal environmental impac.t statement procedures. Proposals for such a 
runway had been at the centre of debates about Sydney's future airport 
needs for twenty years. Throughout that period, a third runway at KSA had 
been strongly advocated by the federal government's aviation authorities 
and by the aviation industry more generally. Previous federal 
governments, with the exception of the Fraser Coalition government in late 
1982, had baulked at giving support to any third runway plan. Labor 
governments, in particular, had been sensitive to the criticisms of such a 
proposal emanating from residents, councillors and parliamentarians in the 
strongly pro-Labor areas around KSA. Those critics had argued that KSA's 
adverse impact on the surrounding urban area, particularly through 
exposure to aircraft noise, was already considerable and should not be 
increased by the addition of an extra runway. Labor governments had 
instead preferred the construction of a second airport as the next major step 
in meeting Sydney's airport needs. Indeed, when the Hawke Labor 
government came to power in 1983, it did so with a firmly stated 
commitment to no third runway at KSA. The Hawke government moved 
quickly to establish a second Sydney airport site selection program in the 
latter half of 1983 and in February 1986 announced that a second airport 
site would be acquired at Badgery's Creek in the south-west of the Sydney 
region. Events appeared to be proceeding fairly smoothly towards Labor's 
no-third-runway plan until sometime late in 1988. 
This article has been accepted for publication in the Current Affairs Bulletin. 
With the coming of Australia's bicentennial year and the overseas 
tourism boom which accompanied it, Sydney's airport facilities became a 
major focus of public attention and debate in a way they had not been for 
several years. Calls for the improvement of airport facilities became 
strident. The Hawke government's initial reaction was to suggest 
accelerated or 'fast-tracked' development at Badgery's Creek. However, 
renewed calls for the construction of a third runway became persistent. 
Aviation industry interests were joined in their advocacy of such a runway 
by diverse organisations and individuals drawn from the tourism industry, 
the Sydney business community and country NSW, as well as the Sydney 
City Council, the newly elected NSW State Coalition government and the 
federal Coalition opposition. Media commentary was generally in favour 
of a third runway and advice coming to the federal government from its 
own aviation authorities was also still strongly of the pro-third runway 
persuasion. In the end, the weight of interest group, expert bureaucratic 
and public opinion proved too great for the traditional Labor forces of 
opposition to the third runway proposal. A reversal of Labor's no-third-
runway policy was finally effected, though the commitment to a second 
airport at Badgery's Creek was also retained. 
The March Cabinet decision to proceed with a third runway was 
generally greeted in the media as a significant policy-making success. 
Rational economic considerations, so the common interpretation ran, had 
finally triumphed in the policy-making process over irrational political 
ones. Indeed the Prime Minister and the Minister for Transport and 
Communications bolstered this interpretation of events by arguing in their 
media release that the decision 'followed an exhaustive analysis of the 
economic and aviation policy aspects of all options for meeting Sydney' s 
airport needs' and that this analysis revealed that the 'economically rational 
option' was 'to build a third runway at KSA subject to an EIS, and proceed 
with the development of Badgery' s Creek but not on a fast track ' .2 
Favourable media commentary was, however, also often begrudging 
in its praise. This derived from the fact that the decision to build a third 
runway had been so many years in the making. Commentators were wont to 
point out that expert reports had been calling for the construction of such a 
2 Joint Statement From the Prime Minister and the Minister for Transport and 
Communications, the Hon. Ralph Willis, 22 March 1989, p2. 
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runway for over twenty years and that past government procrastination and 
policy-making failure somewhat marred the present success. But just how 
much of a failure had past efforts to provide for Sydney's airport needs 
been? How much was past government procrastination to blame for the 
conges_tion which seemed to have reached new proportions at KSA in 1988 
and which had sparked this new round of public attention to the airport 
issue? And just how acute had the need for additional runway capacity at 
KSA become by the beginning of 1989? 
My aim in what follows is to explore these questions both by placing 
the Sydney experience in some degree of comparative international 
perspective and by drawing on the history of the Sydney case in some 
greater detail. I will suggest that the present congestion at KSA is only in 
small part a consequence of past government failure to back the 
construction of a third runway. It is in much larger part the consequence of 
some major unpredicted changes in the various sectors of the aviation 
industry over recent years, both worldwide and in Sydney. Indeed, in the 
context of these rapidly changing circumstances in the aviation industry, 
federal government procrastination over the construction of a third runway 
can be seen for many years to have been a considerable success. I will also 
suggest that present congestion at KSA is, in part, also a consequence of a 
rather passive traffic management approach adopted by the federal 
government's aviation authorities over the years. This traffic management 
regime, as the federal aviation authorities are now beginning to admit, is 
inefficient in its allocation of an expensive public resource and is .capable of 
significant amelioration irrespective of the addition of a third runway. Let 
me elaborate further by discussing developments in the aviation industry 
and in airport planning, both worldwide and in Sydney, since the beginning 
of the jet age. 
THE COMING OF THE JET AGE, UNPRECEDENTED GROWTH AND 
THE RUSH TO DEVELOP AIRPORTS 
In the late-1950s when jet aircraft were first introduced into the fleets 
of commercial air carriers around the world, the major challenges for 
airport policy-makers were to provide longer, stronger runways for the 
new heavier aircraft and to cope with adverse community reactions to the 
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intrusions of jet aircraft noise. In some cities, such as Melbourne, meeting 
these challenges led to the rapid development of new airports on large 
greenfield sites on the edges of the metropolitan areas they served. In 
Sydney, however, as in numerous other cities around the world, these 
challenges were met at the existing airport. At KSA, a late night curfew was 
imposed on jet aircraft movements and the existing north/south runway was 
extended into Botany Bay to the south. 
During the 1960s, ·these two initial problems of airport policy-making 
in the jet age were joined by another; passenger and aircraft movement 
numbers began growing at unprecedented and unpredicted rates. In the 
decade from 1960 to 1970, passenger movements worldwide virtually 
trebled, from 106 to 311 million per annum (see Table 1 and Figure 1). In 
Sydney, they multiplied at a similar rate, from 1.6 to 4.4 million (see Table 
3 and Figure 3). Aircraft movement numbers in Sydney during the decade 
about doubled, from 59,000 in 1960 to 125,000 in 1970 (see Table 4 and 
Figure 4). The incomplete data presented in Table 2 and Figure 2 suggest 
that aircraft movement numbers probably also doubled in the 1960s 
worldwide. 
Aviation and airport planners of the 1950s had failed to foresee this 
rapid growth in passenger and aircraft movement numbers during the 
1960s and were caught by surprise.3 Making up for their omissions of the 
previous years, airport planners now began projecting forward the growth 
rates of the 1960s. Government aviation authorities around the world 
quickly became convinced of the need to provide major expansions of their 
airport facilities, including additional runway capacity, by some time in the 
mid- to late-1970s. Airport construction proposals became 
commonplace-a fourth airport for New York, a third for London, a 
second for Montreal and Tokyo and either a second airport or a parallel 
runway expansion for the existing airport in Toronto, to name a few.4 
3 See Richard De Neufville, Airport Systems Planning: A Critical look at the Methods 
and Experience, Macmillan, London, 1976, especially chapter 3. 
4 See Elliot J. Feldman and Jerome Milch, Technocracy Versus Democracy:· The 
Comparative Politics of International Airports, Boston, Auburn House Publishing 
Company, 1982 and The Politics of Canadian Airport Development: lessons for 
Federalism, Durham, Duke Press, 1983. See also K.J. Radford and M.O. Giesen 
The Analysis of Conflicts over the location of Airports Near Major Population 
Centres, University of Toronto York University Joint Program in Transportation, 
Research Report No 87, 1984 for details of these cases. 
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ill the Sydney case, the Sydney Region Outline Plan of 1968 reported 
the plans of the federal Department of Civil Aviation as being the provision 
of a third runway at KSA by the mid-to late-1970s, followed by further 
airport construction at other sites in the region at some time in the 1980s.5 
In 1969, a Commonwealth government interdepartmental committee was 
established to report on Sydney's future commercial airport requirements 
and in 1970 it recommended that a joint Commonwealth/NSW State 
government committee be established to advance the matter further. ill 
1973, this joint committee, led by the Commonwealth government's 
aviation authorities, sought a decision in principle from the Commonwealth 
government cabinet to develop a third runway at KSA by the early-1980s. 
However, the newly-elected Whitlam federal Labor government directed 
instead that a second airport be developed at Galston in Sydney's north west. 
This was not a proposal which the aviation authorities or the aviation 
industry supported, and it was quickly dropped. Airport construction in 
Sydney was put aside by the federal aviation authorities pending some 
change in the attitude of their political masters. 
This was the sort of equivocation which would lead in later years to 
much criticism of airport policy-making for Sydney. However, Australian 
Commonwealth governments were not the only ones to equivocate in the 
late-1960s and early-1970s. All around the world, resident opposition to 
the airport construction proposals of the late-l 960s and early-1970s was 
concerted and in a few instances, as in Tokyo, quite violent. Many 
governments heeded the views of these resident opponents rather than 
decisively backing the construction plans of their aviation experts. The 
London, New York and Toronto airport construction proposals of the late-
1960s and early-1970s, to name just three, suffered from the same problems 
of government equivocation and lack of support as did the Sydney proposal. 
There were, however, other instances, such as in Paris, Montreal and 
Tokyo, where governments did give decisive support to the construction 
plans of their aviation authorities of the late-1960s and airport development 
did go ahead. 
5 NSW State Planning Authority, Sydney Region Outline Plan, 1970-2000A.D. A 
Strategy for Development, Sydney, SPA, March 1968. 
5 
THE OVERPREDICTION OF RUNWAY NEEDS-THE SUCCESS OF 
NOT BUILDING IN THE 1970S AND EARLY-1980S 
During the late-l 970s and the early-l 980s, the airport construction 
issue lost much of the urgency it had been accorded in previous years. In 
Sydney from 1976, the newly-elected Fraser Coalition federal government 
initiated further inquiries into the city's airport needs through another joint 
commonwealth/state government committee established in conjunction with 
the also recently-elected Wran State Labor government. The Fraser 
government was, however, under little pressure to construct further airport 
facilities at Sydney and it allowed itself to become entangled in a prolonged 
standoff over the issue with the NSW State Labor government, at both the 
political and official levels. While the Fraser Coalition Commonwealth 
government was generally willing to go along with its aviation authorities' 
plans for a third runway at KSA, it argued that it could not act without state 
government support. The State Labor government was of the second 
airport persuasion and it was not until October 1982 that the federal 
aviation authorities finally convinced the Fraser Coalition Commonwealth 
government of the need to proceed unilaterally with a third runway at KSA. 
The reason that the Fraser Coalition government could continue for so 
long to procrastinate over the Sydney airport issue in the late-1970s and 
early-1980s was that the airport planners of the late-1960s had significantly 
overpredicted the additional airport facilities, and particularly runways 
which would be required in these years. As a consequence, when the 
governments which had backed the construction plans of their aviation 
authorities in the late- I 960s opened their new airports and expansions in the 
mid-l 970s, they often found that these new facilities were very 
underutilised. Those governments which had equivocated, on the other 
hand, as in the Sydney case, generally found themselves to be coping quite 
well. Many airports around the world required new terminals to be built or 
old ones to be redeveloped in order to cope with new wide bodied aircraft 
and the larger numbers of passengers which they were carrying. However, 
few if any airports were short of runway capacity; the critical variable 
which had led to the new airport and major expansion proposals of a decade 
before. Indeed, by the late- I 970s, there was even something of a positive 
aversion among governments to building new airports and runways, given 
the underutilisation of those that had been built. 
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The reasons for this fairly consistent overprediction of airport and 
particularly runway requirements of the late-1970s and early-1980s are 
worth exploring in greater detail. Some of them are quite commonly 
understood, while others are not. 
A first reason for overprediction was that airport planners of the late-
l 960s had projected forward the growth rates in passenger numbers of the 
1960s in linear fashion. Actual growth in passenger numbers in the 1970s 
and early- l 980s was not as dramatic as this extrapolation suggested. During 
the 1970s, passenger numbers both worldwide and in Sydney about 
doubled, in comparison with the trebling of the 1960s (see Tables 1 and 3 
and Figures 1and3). In the early-1980s, in what was a major downturn for 
the aviation industry both worldwide and in Sydney, passenger numbers 
actually declined for a couple of years and by 1984 were only just 
recovering to their 1979/1980 levels (again, see Tables and Figures 1 
and 3). 
The second reason that the 1960s airport planners' overpredicted the 
airport needs of the late-l 970s and early-l 980s was their failure to foresee 
the extent of the impact of larger wide bodied aircraft on the practices of 
commercial air carriers, and hence on aircraft movement numbers. In 
worldwide terms, numbers of scheduled aircraft movements of commercial 
air carriers virtually remained static from 1973 to 1983 (see Table 2 and 
Figure 2). In Sydney, international aircraft movements went from 15,000 
in 1970 to 20,000 in 1978 and then actually fell slightly; not recovering to 
their 1978 level until 1985. Interstate aircraft movements at KSA peaked at 
around 63,000 in 1974 and then gradually fell back to as low as 46,000 in 
the slump of the early-1980s (see Table 4 and Figure 4). In short, the 
number of aircraft movements in these two major industry sectors at KSA 
was static or even in decline for over a decade, although passenger numbers 
were slowly increasing. 
A third reason for the 1960s overprediction of airport and particularly 
runway needs of the late-1970s and early-l 980s has to do with the nature of 
runway capacity. Official measures of runway capacity are not absolute. 
Rather they take existing aircraft mixes and daily peak-usage patterns and 
derive an 'attainable ' daily and annual capacity by projecting these patterns 
forward to larger numbers of aircraft movements. In reality, as larger 
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numbers of aircraft movements do eventuate, aircraft mixes are likely to 
change, daily peaking patterns are likely to spread and attainable capacity is 
likely to increase. This can happen both as a result of changes in airport 
user behaviour and can be further enhanced by airport management 
changes-such as the introduction of peak period landing price surcharges 
as occurred in London from the mid-1970s. The officially given 'annual 
attainable runway capacity' for the two London airports at Gatwick and 
Heathrow increased from 315,000 aircraft movement in 1963, to 
approximately 350,000 in 1967, to 480,000 in 1971 and 600,000 by the 
mid-1970s.6 KSA, by comparison, increased it annual attainable runway 
capacity from 180,000 aircraft movements in the early-1970s, to 190,000 in 
the late-1970s, to 203,000 in 1983-84. If we compare these changing 
official estimates runway of capacity to total numbers of aircraft 
movements actually occurring at KSA (given in the right hand column of 
Table 4), it is evident that annual attainable runway capacity at KSA during 
this time continually expanded to 20,000 or more greater than actual annual 
aircraft movement numbers. Aviation experts working on airport planning 
for Sydney and other cities around the world had not predicted such an 
expansion in attainable runway capacity and hence had over-estimated 
runway needs. 
Once these three aspects of the overprediction of airport requirements 
for the late-1970s and early-1980s are appreciated, one of the 
unacknowledged successes of policy-making for Sydney's airport needs 
during these years has to be that successive federal governments did not get 
caught in the rush to construct airport facilities, and particularly runways, 
earlier than they were in fact required. Both the Whitlam and the Fraser 
government's were in retrospect lucky not to have proceeded with further 
airport construction too early. Procrastination during these years certainly 
had its benefits, and decisive support for airport construction certainly had 
its costs; as those involved in the Montreal, Tokyo and Paris cases were soon 
learning. This analysis is at odds with the common interpretation that a 
more successful policy-making outcome in the Sydney case would have been 
to have built the third runway some years ago. 
6 Peter Hall, Great Planning Disasters, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, 1980, p23. 
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THE GROWTH OF SYDNEY'S INTRA-STATE COMMUTER SECTOR 
AND CHANGING RUNWAY UTILISATION AT KSA 
The aviation industry operating out of KSA comprises not only 
international and interstate operators, but also intra-state scheduled services 
and non-scheduled general aviation. In the 1960s, the intra-state sector of 
the Sydney aviation industry was dominated by two airlines, East West and 
Air NSW. Each was licensed by the NSW State government to provide a 
monopoly service on approximately 50 per cent of state's recognised 
network of intra-state air routes. This network served almost 50 country 
centres, some individually and some as part of multi-hop services. From 
the late-1960s, however, the two intra-state airlines began to withdraw 
services from a number of these centres, arguing that the services were no 
longer economically viable given the new types of planes with which the 
two airlines were now operating and the cessation of earlier federal 
government subsidies for the development of rural air routes. In the wake 
of these withdrawals, smaller operators applied to the NSW government to 
licence 'commuter' services using smaller aircraft between unserviced 
country centres and Sydney. The NSW government generally acceded to 
these licensing requests and thus was created a new element of the Sydney-
based aviation industry which came in time to be known as the 'intra-state 
commuter' sector. 
The growth of this new intra-state commuter sector at KSA during the 
1970s and early-1980s was both spectacular and in marked contrast to the 
contemporary slow down in the larger international and interstate sectors of 
the industry. By 1976, when the intra~state sector was first fully separated 
into its 'commuter' and 'regional' components for statistical purposes, the 
commuter sector was already accounting for 22,000 aircraft movements 
per annum at KSA; i.e., almost as many movements as the intra-state 
regional sector's 26,000 and more movements than the international 
sector's 19,000 (see Table 4 and Figure 4). The commuter sector in 1976 
was, however, only carrying about 127,000 passengers compared with the 
intra-state regional sector's 829,000 (see Table 3 and Figure 3). By 1982, at 
the height of its development, the commuter sector was generating an 
expanded 45,000 aircraft movements per annum at KSA and carrying 
327 ,000 passengers compared with the intra-state regional sector's fairly 
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constant 24,000 movements and 747,000 passengers (again,see Tables and 
Figures 3 and 4). 
In summary, during the 1970s and early-1980s, the intra-state portion 
of Sydney's aviation industry, through the commuter service explosion, 
produced a rapidly increasing number of aircraft movements at KSA but 
did not greatly expand its total passenger load. The large international and 
interstate carriers were, by contrast, through the introduction of wide-
bodied aircraft, gradually carrying more passengers with a fairly constant, 
even slightly declining, number of aircraft movements. If we add to this a 
slowly increasing number of non-scheduled general aviation movements 
(see Table and Figure 4), then runway utilisation patterns at KSA during 
these years can be seen to have been changing dramatically. More smaller 
planes were sharing available runway space with a fairly constant number 
of larger planes. 
THE EMERGENCE OF TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND PRICING 
MEASURES AS SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO AIRPORT CAPACITY 
PROBLEMS 
When governments around the world in the early-1970s failed to back 
many of the airport and runway construction plans of their aviation 
authorities, some of these authorities began investigating other 'non-
construction' ways of addressing airport capacity and congestion problems. 
As mentioned earlier, the British airport authorities introduced a peak-
period pricing surcharge at London airports from the mid-1970s. In 
Australia, the Commonwealth aviation authorities responded to the 
Whitlam government's decision to build a second airport at Galston instead 
of a third runway at KSA by arguing that they could handle all aircraft 
movements at KSA until 1990 without further runway construction if 
certain traffic management and pricing measures were introduced. These 
included the exclusion or limitation of access of certain small types of 
aircraft, the abandonment of preferred noise-reducing runway utilisation 
patterns and the introduction of peak-period pricing. These measures were 
further discussed in relation to the Sydney case during the late-1970s, but 
not taken further. By the beginning of the 1980s, some professional 
economists were starting to advocate such non-construction measures more 
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strongly, particularly to cope with the proliferation of small plane runway 
users at KSA.7 This new pattern of runway utilisation at KSA was criticised 
by these economists as an inefficient use of an expensive public facility, 
especially during peak hours of demand. The Sydney Morning Herald gave 
considerable support to these traffic management and pricing ideas as ways 
of catering for Sydney's future airport needs. Indeed, in October 1982 
when the Fraser Coalition government announced that it was finally going 
to proceed with the construction of a third runway at KSA, the Herald' s 
editors were surprisingly critical. They argued that such a runway was not 
necessary and merely represented an increased public subsidy to an already 
heavily-subsidised aviation industry. What was needed, they argued, was a 
more efficient traffic management and pricing system which would 
somehow encourage a rationalisation of the recent proliferation of small 
plane users at KSA, particularly during peak hours.8 
Such suggestions for an alternative non-construction approach to 
Sydney's airport needs in the late-1970s and early-1980s did not meet with 
much acceptance either among the aviation industry or among the 
Commonwealth aviation authorities. Aviation and other interests in 
country NSW saw such ideas as highly inequitable and totally unacceptable. 
They saw them as discriminating strongly against air travellers from 
country NSW in favour of their overseas and interstate counterparts, and 
argued strongly that country travellers had as much right of access to KSA 
as did anyone else. The international and interstate sectors of the aviation 
industry at KSA, while not so actively hostile to these traffic management 
and pricing ideas, were happy enough with the status quo. These sectors 
were not greatly increasing their own runway usage at KSA at the time and 




See Gordon Mills in Sydney Morning Herald, 11-13/2/1980, and Investment in 
Airport Capacity-A Critical Review of the Mans Study, Department of Economics 
University of Sydney, Working Paper No 55. See also P.J. Forsyth 'Airport 
Runway Capacity in the Sydney Region: The Problems of Allocation and 
Expansion', in Christopher Findlay, et al., Changes in the Air? Issues in Domestic 
Aviation Policy, Centre for Independent Studies, St Leonards, NSW, 1984. 
See Editorial in Sydney Morning Herald, 8/10/82 and Gittins in Sydney Morning 
Herald, 11/10/82. 
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The federal aviation authorities were also unconvinced of the wisdom 
of these alternative non-construction approaches to Sydney's airport needs. 
In the past, these aviation authorities had adopted a fairly passive non-
directive approach to traffic management and a very non-demand-conscious 
approach to the charging of airport users. Small aircraft paid only an 
annual fee for the use of the airport and larger aircraft a weight related 
landing charge. All scheduling and other operational matters were left to 
aircraft operators with departing and arriving aircraft essentially handled 
on a first-come/first-served basis, and only minor priority being given to 
scheduled public transport services over non-scheduled general aviation. 
User demand was essentially seen by the federal aviation authorities as 
something that was to be responded to through the construction of 
additional facilities, rather than as something that could be significantly 
altered or directed through traffic management or pricing measures. A 
third runway at KSA was still the preferred approach to providing for 
Sydney's future airport needs and, despite the downturn in the major sectors 
of the industry during the early-1980s, the federal aviation authorities were 
more than willing to accept the Fraser government's support for such a 
runway when it was finally forthcoming in late 1982. While the economists 
and the Sydney Morning Herald had identified the increase in small aircraft 
usage of KSA's runway capacity as inefficient and had suggested some 
alternative non-construction remedies for it, the industry, the aviation 
authorities and country NSW travellers were at this stage not yet interested 
in such an approach. 
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY'S RESURGENCE OF THE MID-1980S 
AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT 
ISSUE. 
When the Hawke Commonwealth Labor government came to power in 
Australia in March 1983, the major commercial sectors of the aviation 
industry, both in Sydney and worldwide, were still in the depths of their 
major downturn. The new government addressed the Sydney airport issue 
as much out of tradition and in response to the Fraser government's recent 
third runway commitment as through any pressing need for new airport 
facilities. The second Sydney airport site selection program, conducted by 
the Hawke government over its first two and a half years in office, was 
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notable for its lack of a sense of urgency about further development of 
Sydney's airport facilities. A second airport site was being selected mainly 
as a way of bringing uncertainty over location to an end and as a way of pre-
empting further urban development of potential sites. Indeed, the lack of 
any sense of urgency in the airport policy-making process was evident as 
late as 1987, when the Hawke government was acquiring the nominated 
Badgery's Creek second airport site at a notably leisurely pace. 
In the period since 1984, however, there had in fact been quite 
significant renewed growth in the large commercial sectors of the aviation 
industry, both worldwide and at KSA. Passenger movement numbers were 
growing steadily again after the plateau of the early- l 980s (see Tables and 
Figures 1 and 3). More importantly, however, aircraft movement numbers 
were also growing again at rates which had not been seen since the 1960s 
(see Tables and Figures 2 and 4). The effect of wide-bodied jet aircraft 
replacing smaller narrow-bodied aircraft was gradually coming to an end 
and more passe'ngers did now mean more aircraft movements. It was 
probably only a matter of time, therefore, before airport development 
would become an issue of considerable public concern and old airport and 
runway construction plans would once again become revitalised. In late-
1987, Airports International magazine identified eleven large new airports 
'in the pipeline', as well as some major upgradings at existing airports. 
Badgery's Creek was listed among these new airport proposals, as were 
others already at a much more advanced stage; such as Osaka's second 
airport to be operational about 1992, London's effective third airport being 
developed through the massive upgrading of Standsted, and new 
replacement airports for those previously serving Munich, Denver and 
Athens. Airports International regarded even these new airports and 
upgradings, however, as 'too little, too late', as too did others close to the 
airport industry.9 
The catalyst for bringing the airport development issue back to public 
prominence in Sydney seems to have been the coming of Australia's 
bicentennial celebrations in 1988, and the international tourist boom which 
9 See 'World Development Survey-Too Little, Too Late' , Airports International 
December 87/January 88 and Editorial Airports International, November 1987. See 
also 'Editorial-Who speaks out in favour of more airports?', Airport Forum May 
1988. 
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accompanied them. Within three months of the Australia Day celebrations 
in Sydney in January 1988, the Australian newspaper had devoted no less 
than three editorials to the Sydney airport issue, arguing that not only did 
the international terminal at KSA need upgrading and expansion, but that 
the time had come for the late-night curfew on jet aircraft to be relaxed and 
for construction of a third runway at KSA to proceed. IO Other media 
commentary also saw KSA as having reached a runway and terminal 
capacity crisis. 
The Hawke government's responses to these renewed perceptions of an 
urgent airport problem in Sydney in 1988 were numerous and far reaching. 
In March, it directed a Senate Committee to examine the 'adequacy of 
international terminal and aircraft handling facilities' at KSA.11 In April, 
in conjunction with the newly-elected NSW State Liberal government, it 
established another joint commonwealth/state task force to look both at the 
'optimum utilisation of existing airports' and at 'the medium and longer 
term phased development and utilisation of airports' in the Sydney 
region.12 From June until August, the Commonwealth government also 
became involved in a process of negotiation with local councils in the area 
around KSA over proposed relaxation of the late night curfew on jet 
aircraft movements, settling finally on a lesser relaxation than that initially 
proposed.13 In September, it announced the go-ahead for major expansion 
plans for the international terminal at KSA. Then, in November, it received 
the report of the joint commonwealth/state task force. 
Throughout 1988, the Hawke government strongly maintained its 
opposition to the construction of a third runway at KSA, arguing instead 
that the development of the second airport at Badgery's Creek could be 
accelerated if necessary. The joint commonwealth/state task force did not, 
however, strongly back the Labor Commonwealth government in this 
policy stance. Their November 1988 report argued that the views of those 
10 See Australian 16/2/88, 22/2/88 and 13/4/88. 
11 See Senate Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure, 
The Adequacy of International Terminal and Aircraft Handling Facilities at Sydney 
Airport, December 1988. 
12 See Report of the Joint Commonwealth/New South Wales Government Task Force, 
The Airport Needs of the Sydney Basin, November 1988. 
13 See Minister for Transport and Communications, Senator Gareth Evans QC, Media 
Statement-Noise Reduction Strategy for Kingsford Smith Airport, 19 August 1988. 
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supporting further runway development at KSA should be considered, and 
the report had done so. The possibility of reconsidering the no-third-
runway line had now been broached, and from there, as we saw at the 
outset, pressures quickly mounted until Labor's no-third-runway policy 
was finally overturned in March 1989. 
THE RUNWAY CAPACITY PROBLEM IN THE LATE-1980S: How 
URGENT IS THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTION? 
Having broadly traced the history of airport policy-making both in 
Sydney and worldwide from the beginning of the jet age to the present, I 
tum in this final section to a more evaluative assessment of the present need 
for runway construction at KSA. Observing the stridency of calls for 
further runway development at KSA early in 1989, one might reasonably 
have concluded that the success of governments of the 1970s and early-
1980s in not constructing additional runway capacity for Sydney too early 
had soured by the late- l 980s to a failure to construct it early enough. One 
could even be forgiven for believing that the existing two runways at KSA 
might physically not be able to handle the numbers of aircraft movements 
likely to be received in Sydney, either at present or over the next few years. 
Such is not the case. 
The runway capacity problem at KSA, as at other airports around the 
world, has always been one of peak-period congestion, rather than of any 
ultimate lack of capacity. Theoretically, with its existing two runways and 
existing traffic control procedures, KSA could cater for as many as 340,000 
aircraft movements in a year, even without breaking the old 7-hour late-
night curfew period (i.e., 55 movements per hour multiplied by 17 hours 
per day and 365 days per year). That, of course, is an unrealistic figure as a 
practical measure of runway capacity. No airport is likely to run at its 
sustainable hourly capacity all day long and all year long. However, the 
question must remain as to how much further towards that theoretical 
figure KSA 's attainable capacity for its existing runways can still move. 
From 1984 to early 1989 official estimates of KSA's annual attainable 
runway capacity rose from 203,000 to 224,000. This latest capacity is still 
17 ,000 ahead of the 207 ,000 aircraft movements actually experienced in 
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1988 and over one-third greater than the official estimates of runway 
capacity which were being given in the early-1970s. 
Past increases in runway capacity at KSA have been achieved almost 
entirely without resort to the sorts of traffic management and pricing 
measures long advocated by professional economists and adopted, to greater 
and lesser extents, at busy airports elsewhere around the world. However, 
peak-hour and indeed peak-minute congestion at KSA has increased to such 
an extent in recent years that the Australian aviation authorities have begun 
recently to reconsider these non-construction runway-capacity-increasing 
measures. 
In 1987 the federal aviation authorities introduced a weight-related 
landing charge for light general aviation users which supplemented the 
former annual user fee, thereby bringing the charging of the general 
aviation sector more into line with that applied to other parts of the 
industry. In early-1989, a peak-period minimum landing charge of $200 
was imposed on general aviation users at KSA, considerably increasing the 
landing charge small general aviation users at KSA would have to pay 
during these hours as compared to outside them. This move by the federal 
aviation authorities was intended to discourage non-scheduled small plane 
users from landing at KSA during peak hours. However, in deference to 
intra-state sensitivities about access to KSA from country NSW, the new 
peak-period minimum landing charge was not at that stage applied to 
scheduled commuter service operators. These latter still pay the same 
weight-related landing charge whatever time of day they arrive at KSA. 
However, the imposition of a peak-period minimum charge on these 
operators is now also being considered as part of a major new traffic 
management and pricing review. 
In their media release of 22nd March 1989, the Prime Minister and 
Minister for Transport and Communications, as well as announcing the go-
ahead for a third runway subject to normal environmental impact 
assessment, also announced that new traffic management measures would be 
implemented at KSA within the next few months. These would be designed 
to reduce general aviation traffic at KSA during peak hours and to alleviate 
the problems caused by 'cluster scheduling' of aircraft arrivals and 
departures by domestic airlines. As a first step towards such traffic 
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management changes, the Commonwealth Department of Transport and 
Communications produced a discussion paper in July 1989 outlining a 
proposed two-phase introduction of a new traffic management regime at 
KSA.14 The first phase would include the introduction of a minimum peak 
period landing charge for all aircraft during the designated peak hours, 
including commuter operators. The second phase, to come into operation at 
the same time as deregulation of the two-airline interstate sector of the 
Australian aviation industry at the end of 1990, would comprise a 
'comprehensive slot management regime'. 
To explain the jargon of this second phase of the proposed new KSA 
traffic management regime, it needs to be recalled that all scheduling 
matters at KSA have until now been left entirely to the airlines. Popular 
times within peak hours, such as 9am, effectively have far more flights 
scheduled for arrival or departure than can possibly be handled by the 
airport. These are the peak minutes within the peak hours, and at these 
times substantial delay is not only likely, but inevitable. Such delay is to 
some extent avoidable, if the number of departures and landings within a 
given time period is regulated to a sustainable level through the allocation of 
schedule slots. Such systems of 'slot allocation' have been in existence in 
New York airports since 1969 and have in recent years come to be widely 
used during peak periods at other busy airports in the United States and 
elsewhere. They have considerable potential for alleviating the worst 
aspects of 'peak minute' congestion at busy airports, thereby rendering the 
peak hours considerably more orderly. 
In Sydney, during periods of bad weather, a voluntary slot allocation 
system has in fact been organised by the airline operators themselves for 
several years. However, phase two of this new proposed traffic 
management regime for KSA would make slot allocation the normal peak-
period traffic management practice, rather than just a device for coping 
with adverse weather conditions. The proposed system would allocate 
numbers of slots in each half hour period to the major runway user groups; 
so many to international, interstate and intra-state users. Allocation of slots 
to individual users within these major user groups would then be made by 
either an administrative or a market mechanism. The system would aim to 
14 Department of Transport and Communications, Review of Traffic Management 
Arrangements at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport, Discussion Paper July 1989. 
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maintain some degree of access for all three types of runway user at all 
times. It would, therefore, have some potential to address the concerns 
voiced by aviation and other interests in country NSW for equitable access 
to KSA for intra-state travellers, while also promoting more efficient use of 
available runway capacity. 
This proposed new traffic management regime for KSA has not been 
fully spelt out and its further development and implementation are far from 
a certainty. However, from the work done thus far, it is clear that there is 
still considerable potential for utilising the existing runways at KSA both 
more efficiently and in a way which provides equitable access to all 
categories of user. Procrastination over runway construction for Sydney 
may, even today, prove to have its benefits as well as its costs. The federal 
aviation authorities and the various sectors of the aviation industry may be 
induced to make better use of the existing runways at KSA than they have 
done in the past, particularly during peak hours. The present rather passive 
traffic management and pricing regime at KSA, may change for the better 
over the next few years in a way that it might not have changed were new 
runway construction about to be complete. No doubt the third runway will 
be well utilised when it is finished, but in the mean time there is little reason 
to despair. KSA can handle more traffic, if its existing runways are 
managed appropriately. 
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Table 1: WORLDWIDE PASSENGER MOVEMENTS OF 
COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS 
Passengers Carried Annual Growth Passengers Carried Annual Growth 
(Millions)(2) exc Rate(%) (Millions)(!) inc Rate(%) 
USSR Scheduled USSR Scheduled 
Year Services Only Services Only 
1945 9 
1946 18 100 
1947 21 17 
1948 24 14 
1949 27 13 
1950 31 15 
1951 42 35 
1952 46 10 
1953 52 13 
1954 58 12 
1955 68 17 
1956 77 13 
1957 85 10 
1958 87 2 
1959 98 13 
1960 106 8 
1961 111 5 
1962 121 9 
1963 135 12 
1964 155 15 
1965 177 14 
1966 200 13 
1967 233 17 
1968 261 12 
1969 293 12 
1970 311 6 
1971 329 6 
1972 368 12 
1973 404 10 489 
1974 424 5 514 5 
1975 434 2 534 4 
1976 475 9 576 8 
1977 517 9 610 6 
1978 587 14 679 11 
1979 754 11 
1980 748 -1 
1981 749 0 
1982 759 1 
1983 798 5 
1984 847 6 
1985 898 6 
1986 958 7 
1987 1024 7 
1988 1076 5 
Sources: (1) International Civil Aviation Organisation, 'Civil Aviation Statistics of the 
World ' ; (2) International Air Transport Association, 'World Air Transport 
Statistics', various years. 
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Table 2: WORLDWIDE AIRCRAFT DEPARTURES OF 
COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS 
Aircraft Annual Aircraft Annual 
Departures Growth Departures Growth 
(Millions)(l) Rate(%) (Millions)(2) Rate(%) 
exc USSR IA TA Members Only 
Scheduled Scheduled and Non-
Year Services Only Scheduled Services 
19 4.1 
1964 4.21 1 
1965 4.67 11 
1966 4.90 5 
1967 5.64 15 
1968 6.03 7 
1969 6.31 5 
1970 6.29 0 
1971 6.30 0 
1972 6.71 7 
1973 9.89 7.05 5 
1974 9.61 -3 6.65 -6 
1975 9.68 1 6.49 -2 
1976 9.98 3 6.68 3 
1977 10.12 1 6.76 1 
1978 10.38 3 6. 11 -10 
1979 10.66 3 6.08 0 
1980 10.57 -1 5.97 -2 
1981 10.14 -4 5.72 -4 
1982 10.15 0 5.61 -2 
1983 10.82 7 5.74 2 
1984 11.41 5 6.26 9 
1985 11.86 4 6.51 4 
1986 12.56 6 7.56 16 
1987 13.09 4 8.28 10 
1988 13.58 4 9.05 9 
Sources: (I) International Civil Aviation Organisation, 'Civil Aviation Statistics of the 
World'; (2) International Air Transport Association, 'World Air Transport 
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Table 3: KSA PASSENGER MOVEMENTS (MILLIONS) 
Year International Domestic Total 
1960 0.16 1.46 I.63 
1961 0.19 1.49 1.68 
1962 0.23 1.51 1.74 
1963 0.27 1.67 1.94 
1964 0.33 1.95 2.28 
1965 0.41 2.21 2.62 
1966 0.45 2.30 2.74 
1967 0.54 2.54 3.08 
1968 0.63 2.76 3.39 
1969 0.74 3.16 3.90 
International Interstate Intra-State Intra-State 
Regional Commuter 
1970 0.87 2.90 0.60 0.04 4.40 
1971 0.94 3.00 0.60 0.02 4.55 
1972 1.09 3.20 0.65 0.04 4.98 
1973 1.26 3.70 0.74 0.05 5.75 
1974 1.52 4.01 0.85 0.08 6.47 
1975 1.62 4.10 0.87 0.10 6.69 
1976 1.76 3.96 0.83 0.13 6.68 
1977 1.76 4.17 0.83 0.16 6.92 
1978 1.92 4.49 0.92 0.19 7.52 
1979 2.26 4.85 0.93 0.25 8.29 
1980 2.41 5.11 0.88 0.27 8.68 
1981 2.36 4.99 0.84 0.27 8.47 
1982 2.42 4.94 0.75 0.33 8.43 
1983 2.32 4.51 0.82 0.30 7.94 
1984 2.51 4.71 0.92 0.28 8.42 
1985 2.76 4.96 1.18 0.28 9.18 
1986 3.08 5.34 1.20 0.27 9.89 
1987 3.56 5.81 1.20 0.26 10.83 
1988 4.07 6.67 1.13 0.32 12.19 
Source: Department of Transport and Communications. 
Note: International includes revenue passengers only. 
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Table 4: KSA AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS ('000S) 
Year International Interstate Intra-State Non-Scheduled Total 
Regional & General Fixed Wing 
Commuter Aviation Aircraft 
Services Movements 










1960 4.8 58.8 . 
1961 5.3 65.1 
1962 5.8 68.9 
1963 6.1 73.5 
1964 6.9 85.3 
1965 8.1 93.6 . 
1966 8.2 89.0 
1967 9.4 43 .8 20.2 26.3 99.7 
1968 10.4 47.7 24.9 26.7 109.7 
1969 11.7 49.6 28.2 28.2 117.7 
1970 i4.5 53.1 30.0 27.8 125.4 
1971 16.1 52.7 27.1 27.2 123.l 
1972 17.1 55.3 30.6 29.5 132.5 
1973 17.5 59.2 33.5 26.9 137.1 
1974 18.5 63.1 42.8 29.9 154.3 
1975 19.4 61.1 46.2 29.3 156.0 
Regional Commuter 
Only Only 
1976 19.5 56.3 25.9 21.6 31.2 154.6 
1977 19.1 57.7 26.0 24.8 32.7 160.3 
1978 20.2 60.2 27.9 28.l 33.2 169.7 
1979 18.2 59.2 28.4 33.7 40.2 179.8 
1980 18.5 59.l 28.1 35.6 41.4 182.7 
1981 17.7 55.0 26.4 36.8 42.3 178.3 
1982 18.6 51.4 23.6 45.2 37.2 176.0 
1983 18.7 46.9 24.7 39.2 38.4 167.9 
1984 19.6 46.0 27.7 33.6 46.0 172.9 
1985 20.1 49.6 31.4 34.1 48.7 183.9 
1986 22.0 54.2 31.9 33.2 49.6 190.9 
1987 24.9 60.6 32.5 32.8 48.0 196.1 
1988 28 .0 63.2 30.5 39.3 45.6 206.7 
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